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l.

INTRODUCTION

Under general principles of international law, an individual can be held liable for an
international offense only when the offense is committed on behalf of an international
state.1 There are a number of notable exceptions to the general rule:

Historically, piracy

has been considered jus cogens,2 and more recently, the Genocide Convention3 and various
terrorism treaties4 authorize international prosecutions against individuals without regard
to their relation to a state. Despite these exceptions, the state agency requirement remains
the central vehicle for distinguishing domestic from international offenses.
The recent trial of Frenchman Paul Touvier for crimes against humanity has brought
the issue of state agency to the fore.

The Touvier case presents the novel question of

whether the acts of a public official of one state can be imputed to a second sovereign state
as acts of that state. The case answers this question in the affirmative: Touvier, the head
of a division of the French military police in Vichy, was convicted of crimes against

'

humanity on the grounds that he was acting to further Germany s policy of racial persecu
tion during the war.5 By allowing a Frenchman to be tried as a German agent, the Touvier
court thus indirectly expanded the reach of the concept of crimes against humanity.
This Article presents a framework for deciding questions of state agency

in

prosecutions for crimes against humanity. It will argue that the correct test for state agency
would focus on the status of the offender and whether there is an expectation of
accountability between the offender and the relevant state. The proposed test constitutes
a rejection of the existing approach to state agency, which focuses instead on the particular
act and the degree to which it has been authorized by the state, rather than on the actor.
This Article will suggest that the Touvier court's extension of the notion of state agency can
be best understood in light of the conception of agency the Article proposes. The Touvier
case thus reflects a potentially significant evolution in juridical thinking about the relation
between individual actors and international states.

l. See Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 206-07 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that customary
international law "does not reach private, non-state conduct "); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774,

776 ( D . C. Cir. 1 984) (Edwards, j., concurring) ("I do not believe the law of nations imposes th e same responsibility
or liability on non-state actors . . . as it does on states and persons acting under color of state law. "); Linder v.
Calero Portocarrero, 747 F. Supp. 1 452, 1 462 (S.D. Fla. 1 990) (customary international law does not establish cause
of action for torture against defendants who are not state actors), rev'd on other grounds, 963 F.2d 332 ( 1 1 th Cir.
1992); see also Draft Articles on State Responsibility art. 19, in Report of the International Law Commission to the
General Assembly on the Work of its Thirty-First Session, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 1 0 , at l, U.N. Doc.
A/34/lO (1979), reprinted in [ 1979]2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 87, 92, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1979/Add . 1 (Part 2)
[hereinafter Draft Articles I]; M. CHERIF BAsStOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HuMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW 235-62 ( 1992).

2. See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 5 3, 16 1-62 ( 1 820); Lours HENKIN ET AL, INTERNATIONAL
LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 468 (2d ed. 1987).
3. Convention on the P revention and P u nishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277
(entered into force jan. 12, 1951 ).
4. See, e.g., International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res. 34/146, U.N. GAOR 6th
Comm. , 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N. T.S. 1 77.
5. judgment of Apr. 20, 1994, Cour d'assises des Yvelines (Fr.); see Alan Riding, Frenchman Convicted of

Crimes Against the jews in '44, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1994, at A3.
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

For the past fifty years, France has struggled to come to terms with its role in the
elimination of roughly two-thirds of the Jewish population of Europe. Over

75,000 French
2,500

Jews were deported during the Second World War, of whom approximately
survived.6

Not all those deported came from occupied France.?

Vichy developed an

elaborate collaboration with the Nazi deportation program, helping to fill a German quota
of

40,000 in 1942.8 Jewish families and children without their parents were packed onto

cattle cars bound for Auschwitz.9 T here is little reason to suppose this collaboration was
anathema to the Vichy government.

Long before collaboration with the Germans had

begun, Vichy implemented its own anti-semitic policies. In the fall of

1940, Vichy passed

a series of anti-Semitic laws depriving Jews of the right to hold political office, authorizing
the internment of foreign Jews, and lifting a ban on articles that fanned racial hatred in the
press, all without prompting from Germany.10 Moreover, there were concentration camps
operating in Vichy long before Germany demanded that Vichy assist its deportation
efforts.ll

1942 in a camp thirty miles
1942, the camp became an assembly point for Jews awaiting

T housands died of starvation and disease prior to

south of Toulouse.12

After

deportation to Nazi death camps.U
Despite this record of persecution, Vichy officials have not been widely prosecuted for
their wartime activities. Immediately after the war, France conducted a handful of trials for
war crimes, but many defendants had fled the country and other sentences were never
carried out.14

Petain himself, for example, was sentenced to death for treason in

but his sentence was commuted by De Gaulle.15

1945,

Rene Bousquet, the chief of police of

Vichy who played a major role in shaping Vichy's policy of collaboration, was given only
a five-year sentence, and the sentence was lifted immediately on the basis of unspecified
"acts of resistance."t6
Paul Touvier was the head of a division of the Milice, the military police organization
of VichyY

In

1946, he was sentenced to death in absentia for treason and again in 1947

for exchanging information with the enemy.l8

Aided by various right-wing members of

the Roman Catholic Church, he remained in hiding until

1967, when the twenty-year
1971, Touvier

limitation on execution of judgment expired under French law.19 T hen in

received a presidential pardon from Georges Pompidou. T his provoked a great outcry in

6.

MICHAEL R. MARRUS & RoBERT 0. PAXTON, VICHY FRANCE AND THE JEWS 343 {1981).

7.

See SusAN ZuccoTTI, THE HoLOCAUST, THE FRENCH, AND THE JEws 208 (1993); see also MARRUS &

PAXTON, supra note 6, at 255-62.
8.

See PAUL WEBSTER, PETAIN's CRIME: THE Fuu STORY oF FRENCH CoLLABORATION IN THE HoLOCAUST

108 (1991).

Id. at l-3.
Jd. at 63-69.
II. Id. at 60.

9.

10.

12. This was the camp known as "Noe."

13. See

id.

See id. at 1-2.

at 121-22.

17.

Id. at 199.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 204.

18.

BERNARD LAMBERT, DossiERS D'AccusATION: BousQUET, PAPON, TouviER 279-80 (1992).

19.

CoDE DE PROCEDURE PENALE

14.

15.
16.

IC.

PR. PEN.] art. 763

(Fr.).
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France, 2o and prompted relatives of Touvier's victims to file an action for cr1mes against
humanity based on acts for which Touvier had not yet been prosecuted.21 After a number
of years of evasion, 22 and an attempt to publish a false announcement of his death,
Touvier was finally arrested in

1989.23

Many years passed while the prosecution

attempted unsuccessfully to bring Touvier to trial.

Finally, last October, the Cour de

cassation24 issued a ruling that cleared the way for trial, 25 and in April of 1994, Touvier
was convicted of crimes against humanity.26

The use of the notion of a crime against

humanity was important in this case, since Touvier could no longer be tried for war crimes
or for violations of the French Penal Code, both of which are barred by a statute of
limitations after ten years. 27 Under a 1964 act of parliament, however, crimes against
humanity are imprescriptible.28
Touvier's conviction was based on his role in the execution of seven Jewish hostages
at a cemetery in Rillieux-la-Pape, on June 29, 1944.29

20.

The killings occurred the day after

See Paul Touvier, un collaborateur dans I'Histoire--Chronologie, LE MoN DE , Mar. 17, 1994, Dossier special,

at III [hereinafter Chronologie] (chronicling Touvier's life until 1993).
21. See Chronologie, supra note 20, at III. Touvier could not be retried for events for which he had already
been convicted. C. PR. PEN. art. 6, para. I. When the present action was commenced, there were three incidents
for which Touvier had not been tried: the bombing of a Lyon synagogue in 1943, the assassination of League of
Human Rights President Victor Basch and his wife, and the execution of seven Jewish hostages a t Rillieux-la-Pape.
On Aprill3, 1992, the Cour d'appel de Paris dismissed the first two charges for lack of evidence. Judgment o f Apr.
13, 1992, Cour d'appel de Paris, 1992 Gazette du Palais [G.P.]. No. 1, at 387, 392, 400 (Fr. ) .
22. It appears, however, that Touvier d i d not have t o go t o great lengths t o avoid arrest. He remained on
French soil without interruption from 1944 until 1989, and at various points lived openly in his family house in
Charmettes with his wife and children. LAMBERT, supra note 17, at 279.
23. Chronologie, supra note 20, at UI.
24. The Cour de cassation is France's Supreme Court.
25. judgment of Oct. 21, 1993, Cass. crim., 1993 Bull. Crim., No. 307, at 770 (Fr.).
26. judgment of Apr. 20, 1994, Cour d'assises des Yvelines (Fr.); see Riding, supra note 5, at A3. The court
originally attempted to deny jurisdiction over the case, claiming that the crimes of which Touvier was accused
involved, among other things, the crime of sharing information with an enemy of war, and that the Cour de securite
de /'etat (Court of State Security) would therefore be the p roper forum to consider the matter. The court o f
appeals of Lyon affirmed the lower court's lack of jurisdiction, agreeing that the matter had t o be heard b y a
military tribunal. The Cour de cassation, however, vacated the order of the Lyon appeals court, and sent the case
to the appeals court of Paris. judgment of Feb. 6, 1975, Cass. crim., 1975 G.P., Nos. 124-26, at 310, 311 (Fr. ) .
The Paris court assumed jurisdiction over the case, but claimed that the law declaring crimes against humanity
exempt from the ordinary statute of limitations for murder did not apply in this case, because of retroactivity.

judgment of Oct. 27, 1975, Cour d'appel de Paris, 1976 G.P., Nos. 154-55, at 382, 383 (Fr.). See discussion infra
note 28.
27.

See MICHELE-LAURE R.ASSAT, DROIT PENAL ET PROCEDURE PENALE 122 (1986).

28. JouRNAL 0FFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE F RAN<;:AISE [j.O.j, Dec. 29, 1964, at 11.788 (Fr.). Prior to 1964, the

same domestic statute of limitations applied to crimes against humanity as to other crimes under French law. For
a discussion of the p roblem of prescription as it relates to the notion of crimes against humanity, see Leila S.
Wexler, The Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the Freru:h Court of Cassation: From Touvier to Barbie and

Back Again, 32 CoLUM. j. TRANSNAT'L L. 289, 318 (1994).
In earlier proceedings, arguments were made to the effect that application of the 1964 law to acts that
occurred prior to 1964 would be retroactive, and hence unconstitutional. The question turned on whether the 1964
law altered the nature of the concept of crimes against humanity or merely clarified a p reexisting concept in
international law. After the question had worked its way through the lower courts, the Cour de cassation said in
1976 that the matter would have to be decided by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. judgment of June 30, 1976,
Cass. crim., 1976 G.P., Nos. 322-23, at 699, 700 (Fr.) . After three years of deliberation, the Ministry concluded
that the 1964 statute was simply declarative of the nature of crimes against humanity, and thus that it was not
retroactive. MICHELE-LAURE RASSAT, DROIT PENAL 215 n.l60 (1987). This decision opened the way for the
prosecution of both Touvier and Klaus Barbie.
29. The present litigation began in 1973, when a s o n of one of the victims filed a complaint before the
Tribunal de gra nd es instances de Lyon, the trial court of Lyon, alleging that Touvier was res p onsible for crimes
against humanity.
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members of the resistance had assassinated Philippe Henriot, the Minister of Information
of Vichy and a rather prorrlinent member of the Milice.30

The killings at Rillieux were

understood as revenge for Henriot's assassination, 31 and the Milice accepted responsibility
for it. 3 2
Among his other duties, Touvier had been in charge of detaining Jewish and political
prisoners, and the seven murdered at Rillieux were among those under his supervision.33
He adrrlitted to having personally selected the victims, and to having given the orders to
the execution team as well as various detailed instructions about how the killings should
be carried out.34

In his defense, however, Touvier asserted that it was the Germans who

demanded revenge for the death of Henriot, and that Knab, the Gestapo chief assigned to
the region of Lyon, had planned a vast reprisal which was to involve the murder of a
hundred or more Jews. Touvier claimed that his direct superior, De Bourmont, managed
to convince Knab to leave the matter in the hands of Vichy officials. 35

De Bourmont,

according to Touvier, then ordered Touvier to organize the execution of thirty Jews
instead. 3 6

Touvier was able to exercise a sufficient degree of autonomy, he claimed, to

reduce the number killed still further, from thirty to seven_37 Rather than think of him
as having killed seven Jews, he argued, he should be thought of as having saved twenty
three. 3 8 Discussion of the legal sufficiency of a defense of the sort Touvier offered is
deferred until the Appendix. The body of the Article will focus on the elements of crimes
against humanity and, in particular, the question of state agency.

III.

CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

The concept of crimes against humanity was formally introduced into international
law by the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Crirrlinals of the
European Axis, signed by the Allies in London on August 8, 1945. 39

Annexed to the

Agreement is the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 40 empowering the
Tribunal to try individuals accused of an international crime, and defining three categories
of crimes:

crimes against the peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. 41

Article

6 of the Charter provides in relevant part:
The Tribunal established by the Agreement referred to in Article 1 hereof
for the trial and punishment of the major war crirrlinals of the European Axis
countries shall have the power to try and punish persons who, acting in the
interests of the European Ax:is countries, whether as individuals or as members
of organisations, committed any of the following crimes. .. .

30. Riding, supra note 5, at A3.
31. Wexler, supra note 28, at 292.
32. See Judgment of Apr. 13, 1992, Cour d'appel de Paris, 1992 G.P., No. 1, at 387, 405 (Fr.).
33.
34.

Id.
Id. at 408.

35. Lee Yanowitch, Touvier Relives Jewish Executions for Court,

REuTERS, Mar.

29, 1994, available in LE<IS,

World Library, Txtnws File.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.

38. Riding, supra note 5, at A3.
39. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European A..x:is, Aug. 8,
1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter London Agreement].
40. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1546, 82 U.N.T.S. 284

Nuremburg Charter].
41.

Id. art. 6.

[herein�:cer
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namely, murder, extermination, enslavement,

deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population,
before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds
in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where
perpetrated.42
The jurisdiction of the International Military Tribunal was not made exclusive. Under the
Agreement, members of the Allied nations specifically retain the power to conduct trials of
war criminals in their own courts for crimes committed within their own jurisdictions.43
Article 55 of the French Constitution, which declares international law superior to
French domestic law,44 provides the basis for the incorporation of international law into
French law. The international concept of crimes against humanity could therefore be used
to prosecute Touvier for violations of international law, despite the fact that he is a French
national and was tried before French courts for crimes committed on French territory.
Although no Frenchman had ever been tried for crimes against humanity before, the

Touvier court did have substantial guidance from the prosecution of Klaus Barbie,45 the
only other person of any nationality France has tried for crimes against humanity.46 The

Barbie case thus supplied the Touvier court with its only direct precedent.
An important preliminary decision of the Cour de cassation in the Barbie case defined
crimes against humanity as:
inhuman acts and persecution perpetrated in a sy stematic way in the name of a
state engaging in a policy of ideological hegemony, not only against persons in
virtue of their belonging to a racial or religious community but also against the
adversaries of this political sy stem, whatever form their opposition takes .

.

. Y

This definition breaks down the concept of a crime against humanity into two main
elements: a material element, i.e. an act requirement, according to which the actor must
have performed an act of a certain sort, such as those listed in the definition of crimes
against humanity set forth in the Charter, and a moral element. The moral element, in
turn, appears to have two components. The first is the requirement that the act have been
performed "in the name of a State engaging in a policy of ideological hegemony."48 The
second is a principle of individual responsibility:

The agent himself must either have

committed the acts in question in virtue of the political, racial, or religious identity of the
victims, or he must have been aware that the victims were selected on that basis.49 The
first component of the moral element can be further broken down into two sub
components. The relevant state must in some sense be an illegitimate one; call this the

42. Jd.
43. London Agreement, supra note 39, art. 6.
44. LA CoNsTITUTION art. 55 (Fr.).
45. Judgment of July 4, 1987, Cour d'assises de Lyon (Fr.); see Nicholas R. Doman, Aftermath of Nuremberg:
The Trial of Klaus Barbie, 60 Cow. L. REv. 449 (1989).

46. See Riding, supra note 5, at A3.
47. Judgment of Dec. 20, 1985, Cass. crim., 1986 BuU. Crim., No. 407, at 1038, 1053 (Fr.) (translation from
the French); see also Doman, supra note 45, at 453-59.
48. judgment of Dec. 20, 1985, 1986 Bull. Crim. at 1053.
49. See )udgme:-tt of june 3, 1983, Cass. crim., 1988 Bull. Crim., No. 246, at 637, 646-47 (Fr.).
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"nature-of-the-regime" requirement. Additionally, the acts must have been performed on
behalf of the state in question; call this the "state agency" requirement.
To summarize, then, the Barbie court's definition of crimes against humanity includes
the following four criteria:

(1) an act requirement,
(2) a principle of individual responsibility,
(3) a nature-of-the-regime requirement; and

(4) a state agency requirement.
We shall consider each in turn.
The acts that can satisfy the first requirement are those specified in the Charter,
namely "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population . . . or persecutions on political, racial or
religious grounds ... . " 50 In a preliminary hearing in the Touvier case, the Cour d'appel
found that Touvier satisfied the act requirement, a point which no one appears to have
contested. s1
The principle of individual responsibility is a specialized
mens

mens rea requirement. The
rea for murder does not require that the killing have been performed from any

particular motive; it will ordinarily suffice if it was done knowingly or with awareness of
a substantial risk of death. 52 Crimes against humanity, however, are like crimes of specific
intent in Anglo-American law:53

T hey require that the perpetrator have acted from a

particular motive. In this case, the act must have been performed in order to further a state
ideology of persecution. 54 Unlike ordinary crimes of specific intent, however, the actor
himself need not share this ideology; he need only be aware that his acts serve to further
a state policy of the relevant sort. The Cour d'appel also easily found that Touvier satisfied
this second requirement, since, by his own admission, 55 he was responsible for selecting
the victims, and he chose them because they were Jews.56
The nature-of-the-regime requirement is not a common condition of international
prosecutions. It is thus difficult to know exactly what the Barbie court had in mind when

50. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 40, art. 6.
51. judgment of Apr.13, 1992, Cour d'appel de Paris, 1992 G.P. No.I, at 408 (Fr.). Touvier's defense could
,

be thought of as denying that the act requirement was satisfied, since his claim that the killings were justified by
necessity,

see infra

Appendix, can be thought of as denying that the killings amounted to murder.

The act

requirement for crimes against humanity includes murder, rather than just killing, in the way that a national legal
instrument criminalizing murder would. But it is preferable to think of the necessity defense in this context as a
plea that one's responsibility for murder should not amount to a crime against humanity, rather than to think of
necessity as applying to the act of murder itself, since the agent has violated a prohibitory norm even if his conduct
is justified.

52. See, e.g., MoDEL PENAL CoDE§ 210.2 (1962) (allowing the mens rea requirement for murder to be satisfied
with a killing performed "knowingly" or "under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
human life").

53. For example, forgery under New York law is when "with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another, a
person falsely makes, completes or alters a written instrument."

N.Y. PENAL LAw§ 170.05 (McKinney 1988). The

Model Penal Code defines burglary as entering "a building ...with purpose to commit a crime therein .... "
MoDF.L PENAL CoDE§ 221.1(1) (1962).

54. See jacques-Bernard Herzog, Contribution ill't!tude de Ia definition du crime contre l'humanitt!, 1947 REVUE
lNT'L DROIT PENAL 155, 158-61.
55. judgment of Apr. 13, 1992, Cour d'appel de Paris, 1992 G.P., No. I, at 408 (Fr.).
56. Further evidence for this lies in the fact that Touvier arranged to have an eighth victim rele as ed after it
was discovered th e latter was not j e wi sh. See Riding, supra note 5, at A3.
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it used the phrase, "a state practicing a political system of ideological hegemony."57

One

possibility is that the court intended to restrict the category of perpetrators of crimes against
humanity to agents of states that fail to comport with standards of international law
generally.

Alternatively, the court might have intended to restrict this category to agents

of states that maintain, more specifically, policies of persecution. Vfhatever the Barbie court
had in mind, the restriction is clearly meant to rule out international prosecution of
offenders from countries like

France.

Although

one commentator

has called

the

requirement a "blatant attempt[] to exonerate ... the Vichy government from wrong,"58

it might nevertheless be defensible under general principles of international law. Interna
tional criminal law should be thought of as helping to fill the gaps left by domestic criminal
law, authorizing prosecutions where domestic law fails to remedy wrongs. 'vVhere the state
itself is illegitimate, a wrongful act will go unpunished unless the international community
steps in.

Where a state is not fundamentally illegitimate, its own criminal justice system

should prosecute the offender, and international law, one might argue, has no grounds for
intervention.

T he problem with this argument, however, is that substantially "good"

regimes may perform "bad" acts, even acts that rise to the level of international crimes.
As France's experience makes clear, one cannot rely on domestic law-enforcement to
prosecute perpetrators even where the conduct is abhorrent to the current regime. There
does not seem to be a coherent rationale, then, for exempting actors of "legitimate" states
from prosecution for international crimes.
Moreover, the nature-of-the-regime requirement derives little support from the various
sources of international law. 59 The closest statement of precedent one can find lies in the
Charter's limitation of those eligible for prosecution to agents of the Axis powers. Putting
matters in the best possible light, the Barbie court might have extrapolated from the
restricted jurisdiction of the International Military Tribunal to the nature of crimes against
humanity generally, interpreting the Charter's specific focus on the Axis powers as implying
a permanent nature-of-the-regime requirement. But a stringent substantive limitation on
the sorts of agents that can commit crimes against humanity should not be inferred from
a mere grant of jurisdiction to a particular tribunal.
Finally, the nature-of-the-regime requirement cannot even be made fully coherent.
Depending on how one interprets the court's mysterious phrase "state practicing a political
system of ideological hegemony," the requirement is either irrelevant to the question of
crimes against humanity or largely redundant of the intent requirement for such crimes.
If the phrase implies a criterion of illegitimacy based on general violations of international
law, the "illegitimate" states might not be the ones whose officials engage in acts targeted
by the notion of crimes against humanity.

For example, an expansionist state with

hegemonic aspirations could be illegitimate under this test, but it might have no propensity
to engage in persecution based on race or religion.

Conversely, a state which largely

respected the co-equal sovereignty of other international states could engage in a policy of
racial or religious persecution of its own population. On the other hand, if the phrase does
attempt to identify states that practice racial or religious persecution, the nature-of-the
regime requirement would be unnecessary: The only important function it could serve is
already served by the mens rea requirement, which limits crimes against humanity to acts
intended to further a state policy of persecution.

57. Other commentators appear to agree. See Wexler, supra note 28, at 343.
58. See id. at 355.

59.

But see Georges Levasseur, Les crimes contre l'humanite et le probleme de leur prescriptior� 93 J. DRoiT lNT'L

259, 271 (1966) (emphasizing that individual act must be reflective of actual state policy for perpetrator to be guilty
of crimes against humanity).
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Notice, moreover, that the mens rea formulation of the requirement is preferable to
the nature-of-the-regime formulation.

International law is concerned to prosecute state

agents who carry out heinous acts in the course of their official duties. \Vhether such acts
reflect actual state policy is irrelevant.

It would be possible, for example, for a state actor

acting in the course of her official functions to regard herself as carrying out a policy of
persecution, and thus to satisfy the mens rea requirement, even if no such policy existed.
The actor, in short, could be mistaken as to the state's actual policy.

The nature-of-the

regime requirement would rule out the prosecution of such "reasonably mistaken" actors,
but these actors should be eligible for prosecution for crimes against humanity. A crime
against humanity is a notion of individual, rather than state, responsibility. It is not,
therefore, the moral standing of the regime that is at issue, but the moral standing of the
individual in her capacity as state actor. Although the question of ultra vires action, namely
action which falls outside the scope of an agent's official mandate, will be addressed in
greater depth below, 6 0 it should be noted here that an individual who was badly mistaken
about the nature of the state's policy could cease to be a state actor with respect to acts that
fell under the supposed policy. Not all mistaken conduct, however, is ultra vires. And in
cases in wh.ich the mistaken official is acting with.in the scope of her authority, she should
still in principle be eligible for prosecution for crimes against humanity, even where the
regime itself is not fundamentally evil.
As one might expect, it was the nature-of-the-regime requirement that provided the
initial obstacle to liability in the Cour d'appel's preliminary decision in the Touvier case.
According to that court, the requirement was not satisfied because "if the Vichy regime
possessed, by the force of circumstances, a certain state policy, it was not in any sense a
policy of ideological hegemony, in the way in wh.ich we have indicated was the case with
respect to Nazi Germany." 6 1

There were several aspects to the court's reasoning.

It

argued first that Vichy was a system of political alliances and oppositions, rather than a
coherent ideology of oppression and racial subordination. 6 2 Anti-Semitism, the court
maintained, did not reach anywhere near the level in France that it did in Germany.6 3
Second, the court admitted that the Milice was an organization that had as its goal the
takeover and militarization of the French government,6 4 and that it did put into practice
a political program of ideological hegemony. 6 5 But, the court argued, the Milice could not
have had the takeover of the French state as its goal if the state already shared that ideology,
that is, if the Milice represented the state as a whole. 6 6 The acts of the Milice thus could
not have been carried out in the name of the French state and therefore could not
constitute crimes against humanity. 6 7 In th.is way, the Cour d'appel also disposed of the
state agency requirement, implying that Touvier could not even be considered an agent of
Vichy with respect to the killings at Rillieux, on the grounds that the acts of the Milice were
not acts undertaken on behalf of the state.

Further discussion of the agency requirement

is reserved for the next Part.
The Cour d'appel thus found as a matter of law that Touvier could not be tried for
crimes against humanity, since the Vichy regime did not fit the definition of the type of

60. See infra text accompanying notes 103-107.
6 1. Judgment of Apr. 13, 1992, 1992 G.P. at 412 (translation from the French).
62. !d.
63. Jd.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 4 13.
!d.

Jd. at 414.
!d.
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Barbie precedent.68 T his court, however, failed to realize what
Cour de cassation later did,69 namely that accepting this pronouncement on the nature
of Vichy did not foreclose conviction in Touvier's case. If, as conceded, the Milice selected
its victims in virtue of their racial or political status, and if the ideology of the Milice was
the same ideology under which Germany carried out its crimes, Germany might be thought

regime required under the
the

of as the relevant international state in whose name the killings at Rillieux were committed.
In light of the reluctance of French courts to characterize Vichy as a German bedfellow, the
surer route to prosecution required an extension of the concept of state agency:

Touvier

could be tried for crimes against humanity as an agent of Germany. In November
the

1992,

Cour de cassation accepted this argument, clearing the way for Touvier's tria\.7°
T his ruling breaks new ground in international law. The case holds for the first time

that a public official of one sovereign state can be the agent of another sovereign state, and
therefore that his acts can be imputed to the second state as acts of that state. The finding
is all the more remarkable in the face of France's evident reluctance to alter its image of
Vichy, since a finding that a relatively high-placed Vichy official committed an international
crime as an agent of the Third Reich ought to impute responsibility to Vichy itself. After
all, treating Touvier as an agent of Germany does not impugn his agency relation with

precisely
because French courts were unwilling to identify Vichy as collaborationist. It is true that

Vichy. Yet the question of state agency with respect to Germany arose in this case

under principles of international law, the Vichy regime can potentially escape international
responsibility for the acts of its agents if, as the

Cour d'appel appeared to be suggesting,

Vichy agents were acting far outside the scope of their official functions.71

But where the

Milice were, a
state, in addition to

state agent is as central to government administration as members of the
finding of criminal conduct ought at least to raise a presumption of

individua� responsibility.
The next Part will attempt to elucidate the basis in international law for the

Cour de

cassation's innovative approach to state agency in the Touvier case. It will argue that this
approach provides the only coherent understanding of the state agency requirement.

IV.

STATE AGENCY

Although not an explicit condition under the Charter, the state agency requirement
follows from the general principle that international law governs relations among states,
rather than among individuals.72

The traditional reason for restricting the focus of

international law to nations is that the notion of co-equal sovereignty would be threatened
if states could prosecute the domestic criminals of other nations.

Although sovereignty

68. Id. at 416.
69. judgment of Nov. 27, 1992, Cass. crim., 1992 Bull. Crim., No. 394, at 1082 (Fr.).
70. Id.
71. See BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTE RNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS
205-07 (1994}.
72. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791-93 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring);
see also GERHARD YON GLAHN, LAw AM oNG NATIONS 61-62 (4th ed. 1981); Ian Brownlie, TI1e Place of the
Individual in International Law, 50 VA. L. RE v. 435 (1964}. Further support for this principle lies in the fact that
only states can appear before the International Court of Justice, whether as plaintiff or as defendant. Statute of
the International Court of Justice, opened for signature June 26, 1945, art. 34(1}, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993; see
also Richard B. Bilder, The United States and the World Court in the Post-"C.-old War" Era, 40 CATH. U. L. REv.

251, 252 (1991).
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considerations do not weigh as heavily in international jurisprudence as they once did, 73
it remains at least politically infeasible for international prosecution to substitute for
domestic law-enforcement.

International prosecution, then, is thought appropriate only

where the offense was committed by a state through its recognized agents.
Despite the importance of the requirement, criteria for state agency have never been
clearly articulated. Moreover, it is not apparent to what specific legal principles one should
turn for guidance, since sovereignty considerations can dictate the need for the agency
requirement, but not its form.

It is at least clear that domestic law is irrelevant/4 and

thus that any guidance on the question must be international in nature.75

International

law, however, has largely failed to address the question of state agency. The Charter of the
International Military Tribunal incorporates the requirement by saying that the defendant
must have been "acting in the interests of the European Axis countries."7 6

But the

Nuremberg prosecutions did not themselves explore the nature of the agency requirement,
since the defendants were all high-ranking German officials, and their status as state actors
was never in doubt.7 7 The course of international criminal law since Nuremberg has done
little to clarify the nature of the requirement.87
What law there is on the question of state agency focuses on the nature of the offense,
rather than on the status of the offender.

The former approach will be referred to as the

"act-by-act"approach, since it restricts its attention to the nature of the particular act under
consideration. This Part will argue instead for what it will refer to as the "status" approach,
under which the court looks to the wider nature of the agent's status relative to the state
in question.

T he Act- by-Act Test and Individual Responsibility

A.

The act-by-act test collapses into what one could call a "lack-of-autonomy"
requirement. If the offender's relation to the state must be manifest in the act itself, it will
be impossible to demonstrate that the individual is a state actor unless the state has
authorized the agent to perform the particular offense in question.

Thus, under this

approach, if the perpetrator decides to perform the act on his own initiative, the act cannot
be shown to be an act of the state, even if the actor is generally authorized to act for the
state.

On an act-by-act test, then, the actor must display little or no independence of

judgment in order for the individual to be considered a state actor with respect to the act.
In most cases, this will mean that the individual must have been acting under orders to
commit the crime. And although the fact that a defendant was following orders does not
provide a defense to crimes against humanity, 79 it can be considered in mitigation of
punishment. 80

T his shows the absurdity of expecting an entire agency relationship to

manifest itself within the confines of an individual action: In practice, the approach implies

73.

See, e.g., joan E. Donoghue, Taking the "Sovereign" Out of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities

Act, 1 7 YALE
489 ( 1 992); joel A. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. lNT'L L.j . I ( 1 99 1).
74. See CHENG, supra note 71, at 207.
75. See id. at 370-72.
76. See Nuremburg Charter, supra note 40.
77. See generally the individual j u dgments in The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 147-87 (judgment of the
International M ili ta ry Tribunal 1946).
78. See BASSIOUNI, supra n ote 1, at 236.
79. Article 8 of the Charter p rovi des that "I t]he fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his Go ve rn
ment or of a superior shall not free him from res ponsibi lity . . . . " Nuremberg Charter, supra n ote 40, art. 8.

j. lNT'L L.
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that any defendant who satisfies the conditions for crimes against h umanity can be
considered fo r mitigated punishment on the basis of those same conditions.
In the To uvier case, Touvier could o nly be convicted of crimes against humanity if he
received ord ers to kill the people whose executions he arranged and he knew that they were
selected on account of their race. He could not be convicted, for example, if he himsel f
decided that the victims should all b e Jewish, even if h e had received orders t o conduct an
execution, and he certainly could not be held responsible if he had acted o n his own
initiative entirely. The act-by-act test in application to the Touvier case would thus be
expected to produce the result that Touvier could o nly be guilty of a crime against
humanity if he took no initiative for the killings himself, that is, if he were following ord ers.
And this is precisely the conclusion the Cour d 'appel reached in its prelimi n ary ruling: The
court fo und that Touvier had operated largely autonomously with respect to the killings
at Ril lieux, and for tllis reason he could not be considered an agent of any state.81
As evidenced by the Cour d 'appel's opinion, the act-by-act test not only rules out the
p ossibility that Touvier was an agent of Germany. It has the further absurd implication that
Touvier was not even an agent of France with respect to the killings at Rillieux. This is
because the autonomy Touvier exercised in ordering the killings would have been suffici ent
under this test to sever his connection to that state as well. Similarly, the test would imply
that a German official who hand-picked victims on the grounds of race, although acting on
orders to perform executions, would not be an agent o f Germany, since he would have
been acting with a certain degree of autonomy. Since on this theory of state responsibility
there is no basis, o utside the particular act under consideration, for linking French agents
to the French state and German agents to the German state, high- placed officials and
anyon e else enjoying a certain measure of autonomy cannot be thought o f as state agents.
Although tllis result appears to be a reductio ad absurdum of the act-by-act approach, courts
have adhered to it nonetheless, even when it required them to exclude the public actions
of a head of state fro m the category of state action.82
Any test of agency which restricts its focus to particular acts will thus be unable to
allow independence of judgment on the part of state actors to co-exist with full state
authorization for the acts p erformed. Indeed, this defect of the approach becomes more
pronounced the higher up on a chain o f command one looks, since the greater the agent's
p ower, the more significant the scope for independent action will be. Requiring the offense
to fal l within the p arameters of an order from a recognized state official will thus exclude
offenses committed by actors with greater autonomy from the ambit o f authorized state
acti on. And this will be true, not only where the offense is committed by a national of one
state and the authorizing regime represents a second, independent state. Offenses
p erformed by individual members of a single state's hierarchy will be excluded from the
ambit of state action if an act-by-act test is used.
The act-by-act test of state agency thus produces profoundly counter-intuitive results.
The correct test would at least accommodate the moral principle that the more an agent
initiates a wicked act, the more culpable he is for it. Although at some point on a spectrum
of initiation, he will cease to represent his state when he acts, there is no reason to suppose
that p oint is reached at the first insertion of independent moral judgment.

81. judgment of Apr. 13, 1992, Cour d 'appel d e Paris, 1992 G.P., No. l , at 4 1 4 (Fr . ) .

82 .

See discussion of the Marcos cases

infra, text accom panying notes 95-108.

1995]

B.

CHANGI NG

NoTioNs

OF STATE AGENCY I N INTERNAT I ONAL

LAw

273

The Act-by-Act Test and State Responsibility

Although there is no law on the question of when an individual can be consi dered a
state actor for purposes of individual responsibility in international law, there are several
sources of law on the question of when acts of an individual can be imputed to a state for
purp oses of state responsibility. A number of cases before both the International Court of
Justice ( I CJ ) and U . S . courts have turned on th e latter question. In addition, the
International Law Commission has proposed its Draft Articles on State Responsibility,
which speak to the question of state responsibility.8 3
Although individual and state responsibility have been treated separately, the criteria
for the two should be the same. Cases of individual responsibility in internati onal law must
satisfy the state agency requirement, and international states are responsible for the acts of
their agents. Under the current state of the l aw, however, there are three types of cases that
will provide apparent exceptions to the general rule. First, there are the exceptions to the
state agency requirement for individual responsibility already noted .84 Thus, for example,
it would be possible for an individual to be guilty of an international crime of terrorism,
and yet for her conduct not to be attributable to an international state. These instances of
liability in the absence of an agency relation could be thought of as examples of universal
j urisdiction on the part of individual nations over certain defendants, rather than as crimes
which are by their nature international .85 The distinction between crimes of international
j urisdiction and international crimes, however, may be one without a difference. It might
be better simply to allow that these forms of individual responsibility provide true
exceptions to the identity of individual and state responsibility.
Second, the extensive principle of sovereign immunity shi elds states from responsibility
for acts for which individuals might nevertheless bear liability, for example, under the Alien
Tort Claims Act (ATCA) .86 Unlike the above additional grounds of individual respon
sibility, however, sovereign immunity does not provide a proper exception, since individual
responsibility will necessarily be non-international in nature where sovereign immunity
applies. An individual can only be responsible in her capacity as state actor where the state
could also be responsible, and this can only be where sovereign immunity is inapplicable .
Third, there are cases in which individuals may be responsible for acts which they
p erform ultra vires, that is, outside the scope of their official duties which may not be
attributable to the state. As with the cases of sovereign immunity, however, the exception
is only apparent, since the form of individual responsibility will not be international in
nature. A state is responsible for many of the unauthorized acts of its officials, and in such
cases the individual will be subject to international prosecution as a state agent as well.

83. Draft Articles I, supra note !, arts. l-32; Draft Articles on State Responsibility, arts. 33-35, reprinted i n
Summary Records of the 1 635th Meeting, [ 1980 ] l Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 270, 270-73, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/ l980

[hereinafter Draft Articles II].
84. See text accompanying notes 2-4 and sources cited therein.
85. This appears to be the approach taken by the Restatement of the Law of Foreign Relations, which treats
such crimes as "piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft . . . " as expanding the reach of a nation's
domestic laws. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF fOREIGN RELATIONS § 404 cmt. a ( ! 986): "This section . . . recognize[ s j

that international law permits any state t o apply its laws to punish certain offenses although the state has n o links
of territory with the offense, or of nationality with the offender (or even the victim)." See also john M. Rogers,
The Alien Tort Statute and How Individuals 'Violate' International Law, 21 VAND. ). TRANSNAT'L L. 47, 48 ( ! 988)
("to say that commission of an 'international' crime, for instance piracy, is 'in violation of international law' makes
no sense. Committing the ctime does not result in a violation of one state's obligations to another.")

86. 28 u.s.c.

§

1 350 ( 1 988) .
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Cases in which the action is not even performed "under color" of state authority will be
ones in which neither the state nor the individ ual can be held internatio nally accoun
tabl e.87
Ke eping the foregoing real or apparent exceptions in mind, one can attempt to shed
light on the question of individual responsibility by considering the more established
sources of international law on state responsibility. The handful of recent cases that have
spoken to the latter question, however, all apply an act-by-act test.
In Libya v. United States,88 for example, Judge El-Kosheri of the ICJ argued in a
dissent that the question of state agency should have been determinative of whether
international responsibility should lie for the 1 98 8 terrorist bombing of Pan Am flight #103
over Lockerbie, Scotland.
The important question, in his view, was whether the
perpetrators could be treated as agents of the Libyan State. Judge El- Kosheri maintained
that the fact that the actors were civil servants in Libya did not imply that the acts co uld
be attributed to the Libyan government.89 Instead, he wrote that the test should be
whether the agents "committed their crime upon orders from their governmental
supervisors or at least with the knowledge and acquiescence of those p ersons."9 0 That is,
he restricted his focus to the particular act under consideration, arguing that the terrorists
did not appear to have committed the act under orders from superiors, and thus that the
act bore insufficient evidence of an agency relation. But if the agents had sufficient authori
zation from the Libyan government to commit acts of this general sort, it should be
irrelevant whether the agents were specifically ordered to destroy flight 103. It is not clear
that other Libyan officials need even have known of plans to commit the offense, as l o n g
as t h e agents themselves who performed it bore t h e requisite relatio n to t h e state and they
were acting within the expected bounds of that relation.
The ICJ explici tly endorsed the act-by-act test of state agency in Nicaragua v. United
States, a suit brought by the government of Nicaragua against the United States for
terroristic and violent activities of the Nicaraguan rebels.91 Nicaragua claimed that the
criminal acts of the Contras could be attributed to the United States, o n the grounds that
the Contras were entirely "recruited, organ ized, paid and commanded" by the U.S. govern
ment.n The Court, however, said that " [f)or this conduct to give rise to legal respon
sibility of the United States, it would in principle have to be proved that State had effective
control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations
were committed."93 Although the Court did not elaborate its view of the agency relation,
Judge Ago articulated the Court's approach to state agency in a concurrence, sayin g that
state agency can only be imputed "in cases where certain members of [the Contras]
happened to have been specifically charged by United States authorities to commit a particular
act, or carry out a particular task of some kind on behalf of the United States."94
Most recently, the act-by-act approach has been used to limit the scope o f a head o f
state's agency relation t o the state he governs. In a class action suit brought against the
estate of Ferdinand Marcos by victims of human rights abuses in the P hilippines during his

87. See RESTAT EMENT (TH IRD) O F FOREIGN RELATIONS § 207 ( 1 986).
88. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1 9 7 1 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial
Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1 992 !.C.). 1 14, 1 99 (Provisional Measures Order of Apr. 1 4 ) (EI-Kosheri,
)., d issenting).
89. Id. at 202.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

!d.

M i li tary and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1 986 !.C.). 1 4 (June 27).
!d. at 64, para. 1 1 4.
!d. at 64-65, para. 1 15 (emphasis added).
!d. at 1 8 1 , 1 88-89, para. 16 (separate opinion of Judge Ago) (em p hasis added) .
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tenure (Estate II), the Ninth Circuit held that Marcos was not responsible as an agent or
instrumentality of the Philippine state for his acts as head of state.95 The court explained
that Marcos was not "an absolute autocrat,"96 but instead a head of state bound by laws,
and that where his actions violated the l aw, they could not be considered acts of the
state.97 The court thus maintained that actions performed in vi olation of a sovereign's
legal powers are indivi dual, rather than sovereign, actions.98 Similarly in an earlier case
(Estate I), the Ninth Circuit had found that Marcos' daughter, Imee Marcos-Manatoc, in
charge of a portion of the military police in the Philippines, was also not acting in her
o fficial capacity when she authorized numerous acts of violence.99 The court held that
because Marcos-Manatoc exercised a reasonable degree of autonomy, her acts were not
within her offici al mandate and were therefore not the acts of the Philippine state for
purp oses of sovereign irrununity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). l00
These holdings are the natural but unfortunate consequence of the act-by-act test of
state agency. They are another manifestation of the idea that an agent must have been
following orders for his act to be an act of the state. In Estate II, the statutory mandate to
which Marcos was subj ect plays the role o f the required comman d: Marcos' actions cannot
be thought of as state action unless they were directly authorized, and for a head of state,
authorization can only come from the laws under which he is bound to govern. But surely
these cases provide a clue that something has gone badly wrong: A test of state agency
should not produce the result that the actions of heads of state and high government
officials, conducted in the course of state governance and "under color" of state authority
are removed from the category of state action and relegated to the domain of private action.
Abuse of power should not turn state action into private violence .
Enlarging the scope of governmental responsibility under t h e current state of the law
would have the undesirable consequence of enlarging the reach of sovereign irrununity
under U.S. laws, since the only exceptions to sovereign immunity are restricted to the few
listed in the FSIA .l 01 But the present convoluted method of limiting sovereign immunity
by artificially excluding large portions of o fficial behavior from the scope of state action is
ultimately untenable. Not only does it contort legal reasoning in cases implicating the
FSIA, but it has unfortunate implications for other areas of the law which involve state
agency, to which its impact on international criminal law attests. A more coherent solution,

95. In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1 467, 1 472-74 (9th Cir. 1 994), cert. denied, 1 15 S. Ct. 934
( 1995). The court did find that it had j urisdiction over him as a private citizen. Id.
96. Id. at 1 47 1 .
97. Id. The court instead assumed j u risdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 2 8 U.S.C. § 1350 ( 1988).
U nfortunately, against the background of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ( FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1 330, 1 602- 1 1
( 1988), the court could not have had jurisdiction over the Marcos estate without finding that Marcos' acts were
not acts of the state, since Marcos would have been immune to prosecution under the FSIA if his acts had been
judged to be acts of state. See Princz v. Federal Republic of Germ., 26 F.3d 1 166, 1 1 73-74 (D.C. Cir. 1 994)
(holding that the waiver exception of the FSIA does not apply to jus cogens violations generally); Siderman de Blake
v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 7 1 9 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[A] violation of jus cogens does not confer jurisdiction
under the FSIA.").
98. 25 F.3d at 1 470.
99. In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 497-98 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 1 1 3 S. Ct. 2960
( 1993).
1 00. Again, the court found it had jurisdiction over the defendant as a private citizen under the Alien Tort
Claims Act. Jd.
1 0 1 . Jd.
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and one called for by a number of scholars, would be to extend the exceptions to immunity
under the FSIA. 102
C.

Tile S tatus Approach to S tate Agency: A Proposal

The most salient feature of the agent-state relationship is a set of shared expectations
between the agent on the one hand and the state or its recognized agents o n the other. In
parti cular, an agency relationship arises when both the agent and the state regard the agent
as acco untable to the state for purposes of carrying out the state's po licies. What is of
greatest reievance to state agency, then, is the existence of a shared understanding that the
agent has assumed a certain type of accountability to the state.
Accountability need not be based on a relationship of superior to infe rior. A group
of individuals, for example, embarked on a j oint venture tend to regard themselves as
accountable to one another, even if all members of the group enj oy the same status.
Moreover, accountability can obtain whether or not the agent is a n ational of the state.
National ity would appear to have little or no bearing on the matter. N o r should p hysical
presence on the state's territory be in itself a relevant consideratio n . The fact that an
individual was a German national, for example, living in B erlin during the Third Reich d o es
not help to establish that p erson as an agent of the German state. Similarly, that an
i ndividual was not a German national and was not living in Germany should not p reclude
her from having an agen cy relationship with Germany. Nor does the fact that an actor was
an official in the state government definitively establish state agency, since official status
does not entail a shared expectation of agent-accountability with respect to all matters.
Official status may create a presumption of state agency, but it should be possible for an
agent's duties to be sufficiently circumscribed that the necessary element of shared expecta
tions of accountability of the agent to the state is limited to certain spheres o f activity. O n
the other hand, that a person d i d n o t have a n official position in t h e state's bureaucracy
should not create a presumption that the individual was not a state actor, since mutual
expectations can easily develop outsid e of official bureaucratic channels.
On a status approach, the higher up on a chain of command one moves, the stronger
will be the presumption of agency and the broader the scope of the agency powers. The
limiting case is the n early total accountability of the head of state. Although p urely
personal actions by a head of state need not be thought of as state action, any action
undertaken in the public arena by a head of state should be considered state actio n. That
an act was contrary to law thus should not stand as grounds for excluding it from the
sphere of state action. Although it is possible for a head of state to commit a crime as a
p urely private actor, most crimes committed by members of a ruling p arty utilize official
channels and state power for their commission. International responsibility for such crimes
should not be easily evaded by devices that attempt to transform them into private acts.

102. As courts and commentators have pointed out, the structure of the FSIA makes little sense, since the Act
allows an exception to sovereign i mmunity for violations involving commercial activity but not for grave human
rights violations. See Princz v. Federal Republic of Germ., 813 F.Su p p . 22, 26 (D.D.C. 1 992) (holding that the FSIA
"has no role to play where the claims alleged involve undisputed acts of barbarism") , rev'd 26 F.3d 1 1 66, 1 184-85

(D.C. Cir. 1 994) (Wald, J., d i ssenting) (arguing that "the only way to interpret the FSIA in accordance with
international law is to construe the Act to encompass an i m p lied waiver exception for jus cogens violations"); see
also Joan Fitzpatrick, The Future of the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1 789: Lessons From In Re Marcos Human Rights
Litigation, 67 ST. JoH N's L. REv. 491 ( 1 993); Adam C. Belsky et al., Comme nt, Implied Waiver Under the FSIA: A
Proposed Exception to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory Norms ofInternational Law, 7 CAL L. REv. 365 ( 1 989)
(ar g uin g that the FSIA should itself be und erstood as allowing an exception to sovereign immunity in cases of grave
h u rnan rights abuses).
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The status approach to state agency must be understood as accompanied by a certain
approach to the question of ultra vires conduct. Under the status approach, the scope of
ultra vires action will be relative to the scope of the agent's grant of authority. The more
general the grant of authority to an agent, the more difficult it becomes to argue that the
agent was acting ultra vires, since the broader the category of official acts would be. The
status app roach would thus shrink the d omain of ultra vires cond uct overall, in keeping
with its significant expansion of the scope of state action for upper-level officials. The
agent's sphere of international responsibility, then, would depend on the un d erstanding that
obtained between the individual an d the state regarding the individual's role in furthering
state policies. Thus a state might choose to extend authority to an agent only for purposes
of accomplishing a discrete task. In this case, the act-by-act approach an d the status
approach would result in the same inquiry, and the sphere of state action for that agent
would be limited to the particular act for which he was engaged. Although the scope of
state action for an individual engaged for a limited purpose would itself be limited, a state's
responsibility should increase with the generality of its grant of authority to the agent. The
act-by-act approach appears to produce the opposite result: It diminishes the domain of
state action and similarly augments that of ultra vires action as the l evel of autonomy on
the p ar t of the agent increases. The status approach, by contrast, would include all but the
most private and personal of actio ns in the category of state action for actors whose grant
of authority allows for a sign ificant degree of autonomous action. 1 03
This approach to ultra vires conduct suggested by the status approach is largely
consistent with that of the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations. 104 Section 207, which
addresses the question of state responsibility for the acts of its agents, provides that " [ a]
state is responsible for any violation of its obligations under international law resulting
fro m action or inaction by . . . any organ, agency, official, employee, or other agent of a
government or of any political subdivision, acting within the scope of authority or under
color of such authority. " 105 Comment d, which defines the "scope and color of authority,"
goes on to say:
state is responsible for acts of officials and official bodies, national or local,
even if the acts were not authorized by or known to the responsible national
authorities, indeed if expressly forbidden by law, decree or instruction. In
determining whether an act was within the authority of an official or an official
body, or was done under color of such authority . . . one must consider all the
circumstances, including whether the affected parties reasonably considered the
action to be official, whether the action was for public purpose or for private
gain, and whether the persons acting wore official uniforms or used official
equi pmen t. l 06

A

1 03. P roperly speaking, there are four categories of action as related to state agency: ( 1) p u rely p rivate acts
which bear no relation to any state but which do not contravene either domestic or international laws (e.g., the
sovereign brushing his teeth) ; (2) purely p rivate acts of a state official which the official is not authorized to
p erform (e.g., the Secretary of State goes on a shooting spree); (3) state acts of a state official which the official is
authorized to perform; and (4) state acts of a state official which the official is not authorized to p erform, but
which nevertheless are performed "under color of authority." I t is this last category that has proven difficult for
purposes of both sovereign i m m u ni ty and conduct which is ultra vires. It is also for thi s category of acts that the
act-by-act and the status approaches provide sharply di vergent answers.

1 04. RESTATEMENT (TH IRD) O F FoREIGN RELATIONS (1986).
105. Id. a t § 207 cmt. c (emphasis added).
106. Jd. a t cmt. d.
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The Restatement approach makes clear that individual actions need not be specifi cally
authorized in order to count as state action. What matters instead is that the acts are
performed under color of a u thority. This test implies a status approach to state age ncy,
because determining whether the acts are performed under color of authority, when the acts
are not specifically authorized, will require general consideration of the nature of the
individual's relation to the state. The approach is necessarily a flexible one, expl oring
factors such as the agen t's motivation for the act, as well as the appe arance of the actor.
The resulting category of ultra vires action is likely to be much narrower than on an act-by
act approach, restricting non-international conduct to that which IS truly private in
nature. l07
The status approach to individual responsibility is also consistent with the I LC's
approach to state responsibility. 1 08 Article 8 of the Draft Articles attributes to the state
the conduct of persons acting on its behalf. 109 No exception is made for agents acting
in violation of the laws of the state. Article 5 provides that the conduct of any organ
recognized under that state's law as a state organ "shall be considered as an act of the state
concerned under international law, provided that organ was acting in that capacity in the
case i n question. " 1 10 Thus, official status is not dispositive under the Draft Articles: An
organ officially recognized under the internal laws of the state may in certain cases be acting
outside the scope of its official capacity. Similarly, Article 7, sectio n 2 provides:
The conduct of an organ of an entity which is not p art of the formal structure
of the State or of a territorial government entity, but which is e mp owered by the
internal l aw of that State to exercise elements of the governmental authority,
shall also be considered as an act of the State under internatio nal l aw, provided
that organ was acting in that capacity in the case in question. l 1 1
Thus, an individual lacki n g an official position may b e engaged b y a state to act o n its
behalf, and the actions of that agent will be the actions of the state if the agent was acting
in the capacity for which she was engaged.
It is important to stress the difference between the approach proposed here, which
draws support from the ILC's recommendations for state responsibility, and the more
standard approach to the state agency of individuals, exemplified by the 1 992 l ower court
ruling i n the Touvier case. While the Touvier court was concerned with the actor's relation

1 07. Section 702 of the Restatement ap pears to p resent an exception to the broad a p p roach to state agency
of § 207 for human rights violations which are not also breaches of treaty obligations. After citing to the state
responsibility p rovision of § 207, Comment b of § 702 states:
The violations of human rights cited in this section [§ 702] , however, are violations of customary
international law only if p racticed, encouraged, or condoned by the government of a state as official
policy. A state is not responsible under this section for a violation of human rights by an official that
was not authorized, encouraged, or condoned by the responsible governmental authorities of the state.
Jd. at § 702 cmt. b. The Restatement thus appears to retreat from its broad conception of state responsibility
uniquely with respect to human rights violations. The approach to individual agency suggested in this Article maps
onto the more general approach to state agency found in § 207 and would accordingly eliminate the exception
found in § 702.
108. See generally Draft Articles I, supra note I.

1 09. The article p rovides: "The conduct of a person or group of persons shall also be considered as an act
of the State under international law if: (a) it is established that such person or group of persons was in fact acting
on behalf of that State
1 10. Id. art. 5.
I l l . Id. art. 7(2).

.

.

. . " Id. art.

8.
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to the state with respect to a particular act, the present approach requires no interaction
between an individual and the state on the level o f the act. The important question on the
status approach is whether the agent has a general grant of authority to act for the state,
and if so, whether the agent was acting in his capacity as state agent under that grant. The
idea of general, as opposed to act-by-act authorization, squares with the suggestion that the
agent and the state must have shared expectations about the role of the agent with respect
to the state. If the individual regards himself as acco untable to the state government, and
the government in turn regards the agent as responsive to it, whether the agent was
specifically directed, or even more generally authorized to perform the act in question
would appear to be irrelevant, as long as the agent was acting within his official capaci ty.
Consider the applicati on of the status approach to the To uvier case. The question is
whether Germany authorized Touvier to act on its behalf. Suppose for the sake of .
argument that Touvier had little or no con tact with German officials himself, but that he
was ordered by De Bourmont who maintained regular contact with the Germans. It is
surely not n ecessary for Touvier to have been directly authorized to act on Germany's
behalf; it should suffice if De Bourmont, or whoever might have been first in line, was
directly authorized by Germany and that De Bourmont authorized To uvier to act. At l e ast
this analysis is sound if the grant of authority to De Bourmont were suffi ci ently gen eral that
it fell within the scope of his duties to authorize others to act. It is sufficient that Vichy
officials were empowered to act for Germany; the l esser officials they empower need not
themselves have had contact with Third Reich officials. The next question is whether Vichy,
or the Vichy officials from whom Touvier derived his authority, had the requisite
relationship with Germany. There are thre e theories under which an agency relationship
could be found to exist. First, the acts in question would be attributable to Germany if
Germany specifically directed or engaged Milice officials to commi t the murders. This
would be an instance of the sort of limited agency relationship a state can create on a one
time basis by engaging an individual to perform a particular task. This theory is reflected
in the Draft Articles, which allows that a government can empower an organ of another
state to act under its authority without controlling the state of which the organ is an official
p art:
The conduct of an organ of an entity which is not part of the formal structure
of the State or of a territorial governmental entity, but which is empowered by
the internal law of that State to exercise elements o f the governmental authority,
shall also be considered as an act of the State under international law, provided
that organ was acting in that capacity in the case in question. 1 1 2
This basis for e nlarging responsibility would be most appropriate in a situation in which
an isolated organization within a state attempted to break away from its own government
with the assistance and collaboration of an outsid e enemy. If sufficient collaboration
obtained between the organization and the other state, the latter could be internationally
accountable for the acts of the organization. If, for example, Germany had independent
r elations with the Milice, and had specifically engaged it to perform certain tasks, the actions
of the Milice would be actions attributable to Germany under this p rovision.
Second, even if French o fficials undertook the killings at Rillieux on their own
initiative, Germany can be held responsibl e for the event if it exercised general control over

1 1 2.

Draft Articles !, supru note l, art.

7(2).
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the conduct o f Vichy officials. I t would not b e necessary, under this theory, for a legal
relationship to exist in order to establish an agency relation ben.veen the two countries.
This theory of agency is reflected in Articl e 2 8 of the Draft Articles:
internationally wrongful act committed by a S tate in a field of activity i n
which that State is subj ect to th e power of direction or control of an o ther S tate
entails the international responsibility of that o ther State . 1 1 3

An

Un der Article 2 8 , if Vichy was subject to " the power of direction or control" o f Germany,
then any internationally wrongful acts of Vichy are attributable to Germany. On the
proposed analysis, this would subject individual officials of Vichy to international criminal
liability as German agents. This theory of agency would be appropriate for a situation in
which the upper echelon of the Vichy regime had effectively collapsed into the ad�
ministration of the Third Reich. If Vichy officials relied on a grant of authority of German
officials for their power and status, French officials would all be German o fficials for
purposes of international law. The distinction ben.veen the n.vo regimes would have
dissolved.
Third, under the Draft Articles it is possible for a state to be responsible for the
intern ationally wrongful acts of another state if the first state assists the second state in
commi tting these acts:
Aid or assistance by
for the commission
itself constitutes an
or assistance would

a State to ano ther State, if it is established that it is rendered
of an internationally wrongful act carried out by the latter,
internationally wrongful act, even if, taken alone, such aid
not constitute the breach of an international obligation. 1 1 4

This provision establishes the concept of joint liability among states under international law.
Under this approach, it would not be n ecessary to decide whether Touvier was an agent o f
Germany. Vichy would be responsible for aiding Germany in t h e commission of
internationally wrongful acts, and Vichy officials could be trie d for crimes against humanity
as authors of those acts. In this way, it would be possible for acts of a Vichy state actor t o
be d o n e "i n t h e name" or "on behalf" of Germany, without those acts having been
performed by someone who is himself an agent of Germany.
As discussed in Part II, there is every reason to suppose that Vichy carried o u t a p o licy
of vicious persecution of Jews and political resistants without prompting from Germany,
and that the Vichy regime fully shared Germany's ideology.l15 In light of this history,
it is probable that Vichy was a willing assistant in Germany's genocidal p l ans. Had i t not
been d etermined to put Vichy on a different moral plane from the Third Reich, the Touvier
court would have had ample basis for finding that Vichy was a state "practicing a political
system of ideological hegemony."1 16 It appears, however, to be psychologi cally expedient
for French courts to avoid gazing on Vichy's own policies of persecution with a cold eye,
since such an assessment would produce the inevitable conclusion that Vichy was as
motivated to eradicate its Jewish population as was the Third Reich. Indeed, the inde�
pendent enthusiasm with which Vichy embraced anti-Semi tism, and i ts resulting moral
independence from Nazi Germany, seem to provide the very conditions that make
dispassionate assessment of Vichy's culpability impossible. Vichy's racist agenda would be

I 13.

Id.

I 1 4 . Jd.

art. 28( 1 ) .
art.

27(2).

1 1 5.

See supra text accompanying notes 8 - 1 6 .

1 1 6.

judgment of Ap r. i 3 , 1 992, Cour d'ap pel de P a ris, 1 992 G.P., No. ! , at 4 1 4

(Fr. ) .
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all the easier for France t o face if i t could b e understood as the mere implementation of
another country's ideology.
lf one works within the constraints imposed by the French courts and accepts that

Vichy do es not fit the required definition of an illegitimate regime, the collaboration
between Vichy and the Third Reich nevertheless supports the existence of an agency
relationship between Touvier and Germany under the third of the theories outlined
above. 11 7 Starting in 1 942, the Vichy government made a series of agree ments with the
Germans that formalized the coop eration of Vichy in deporting Jews to Nazi concentration
camps in exchange for various French police privileges. 1 18 Apart from suiting its own
an ti-Semitic ideology, these agreements benefited Vichy by creating political clout with
Germany. 1 1 9 If Vichy's persecution of the Jews does not qualify it as an illegitimate state
in its own right, the l evel of assistance it afforded Germany provides the basis for treating
the Vichy regime as an accomplice . The acts of its agents are acts performed "on behal f
of" Germany.
Between 1 942 and 1 944, Vichy increasingly came under the power of the Third
Reich . 1 2o On November 29, 1 943, Petain, who had shown a desire to maintain France's
status as an independent and sovereign nation, was ordered to step down by Otto Abetz,
a high German official stationed in Paris. Abetz's order also stated that all French l aws
would henceforth have to be submitted to the occupying powers in the North for approv
aJ .m Petain was replaced by Laval, who was willing to bow entirely to the Nazis, m
and who, from December 1 943 until August 1 944, headed the Vichy regime entirely on his
own. 1 23 During this period, Laval took orders directly from Abetz, and all vestiges of
independence from Germany were eliminated. l 24
During this period of increasing German control , the second theory outlined
above 1 25 might be a more appropriate basis for regarding Vichy officials as agents of
Germany than that provided by the prosecution. The Germans had de facto control over
the d ay-to-day operations of the Vichy regime, and the State was effectively absorbed into
the occupying powers in the North.126 Since the killings at Rillieux took place in 1 944,
this is probably the most accurate theory under which to regard Touvier as an agent of
Germany. It should be noted, moreover, that this state of affairs could not be used as a
basis for denying Vichy's responsibility, since, as already mentioned, it is not a defense to
an international criminal prosecution that the defendant was following orders_127
Finally, the first theory outlined above 1 28 would appear to be the least appropriate
to the circumstances surrounding Touvier's crime. There is no evidence that collaboration
with the Germans was restricted to certain organizations in the Vichy regime alone, or that
the relations between the Milice and the Germans did not characterize the State as a whole.
I t should be noted, however, that arguments made at trial tending to show the relative

1 1 7. See supra text accompanying note 1 1 4.
1 18. See WEBSTER, supra note 8, a t 1 07- 1 4.
J 19.

Jd. at 1 07-08.

120. See generally MA RRUS & PAXTON, supra note 6, at 281-340.
1 2 1 . fRAN<;O IS- GEO RGES DREYFUS, H I STO I R E D E VICHY 732-33 ( 1 990).
1 22. WEBSTER, supra note 8, at 1 74.
1 23. See id. a t 1 74, 1 98.
1 24. D RE Y F US, supra note 1 2 1 , at 750-52.
125. See supra text accom p anying note 1 1 3.
1 26.

See supra text accom p a nying notes 1 09- 1 1 2.

1 27. See N u re m berg Charter, supm n o te 40, art. 8 .
128. See supru text accompanying n o t e 1 1 2.
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anomal ousness of high level collaboration between elements in Vichy and the German state
could still allow a finding of state agency under this theory.
It would appear, then, that there are at least two theories under which To uvier could
be tho ught of as an agent of Germany with respect to the killings at Rillieux: He was an
agent of Germany either because he belonged to an organ of the Vichy regime which
afforded significant assistance to the Nazi government, or because th e Nazi regime exerted
a high level of control and direction over the daily operations of the Vichy government.
V.

CoNcLUSION

If crimes against humanity are to be tried on the territory on which the criminal acts
o ccurred, the important psychological and political stake local courts have in the outcome
of the proceedings dictates a rethinking of the criteria for state agen cy. Requiring a court
to offer an extremely unflattering portrait of its own historical legacies in order to find one
of its nationals guilty of crimes against humanity creates unnecessary obstacles to the
successful prosecution of such cases, at least in situations in which there is more than a
singl e regime involved in the implementation of a common persecutive program.
The notion of state agency receives inconsistent and sometimes inco herent treatment.
It is apparently all too tempting for courts, both in France and in the United States, to
tailor the concept to suit the needs of a particular case. An approach to state agency based
on the status of the actor, rather than on piecemeal evaluation of his b eh avior on an act-by
act basis would allow international law to develop consistently in this area. It would also
provide the broadest foundation for conducting international prosecutions for human rights
violations consistent with sovereignty restrictions. It would thus allow international
condemnation to play a more significant role in efforts to hold perpetrators o f wide -spread
atrocities accountable for their actions.
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AP PENDIX: THE LESSER EVIL

Touvier claimed that he was faced with a choice of evils:

allow De Bourmont to kill

thirty Jews in revenge for the killing of Henriot, or implement his own p l an to kill seven,
which, he believed, would pacify the German desire for revenge equally wel l .

To uvier's

claim, then, is that but for his intervention, thirty Jews would have been killed, rather than
seven. Touvier argues, therefore, that he should be thanked for saving twenty-three, rather
than tried for the murder of seven.

If the facts were as Touvier claimed, should he have

a j ustification of n ecessity?
The defense of n ecessity has generally been understood as requiring, at a minimum,
that the threatened harm which the actor chose to avoid was imminent and certain, that the
threatened harm would be worse than the harm chosen, and that the threatened harm could
not have been avoided by any other means. Several o f these elements appear in Article 3 3
o f the Draft Articles on State Responsibility on "state o f n ecessity" defenses, which provides
that the harm must represent "a grave and imminent p eriJ . " 129

The "effectiveness" re

quirement-that the chosen act was the o nl y effective means for avoiding the harm in
question-is also reflected i n Draft Article 3 3 , which says that it must be the case that "the
act was the only means of safeguarding an essential interest of the State"t30 against the
threatened peril .
This condition is also incorporated in an article dealing with another sort of defense
under intentional law, the defense of "distress." Article 32 provides that the wrongful ness
of an act is precluded if the actor acting on behalf of the state "had no other means, in a
situation of extreme distress, of saving his life or that of persons entrusted to his care ." 1 3 1
And since Touvier was in charge of Jewish and political prisoners of the Milice in the region
to which he was assigned, he might attempt a defense of distress, citing the lives of the
twenty-three prisoners he allegedly "saved" from execution.
With respect to a possible n ecessity defense, there is no question that the gravity
requirement is satisfied.

It also seems reasonably clear that the harm threatened is worse

than the harm chosen, since presumably the death of thirty is worse than the death o f
seven. l32

It is doubtful, however, that the imminence requirement is satisfied.

Touvier

would have had to present evidence that the German action was immediately forthcoming,
as well as evidence bearing on the certainty o f the event. Suppose, however, he could meet
these two requirements. The real problem with the n ecessity defense lies in satisfying the
e ffectiveness requirement. It would be difficult to demonstrate that there was no other way
to cause the Nazis to desist from their purpose when the threatened harm was to take place
on non-occupied territory, largely under the control of the Vichy regime. Touvier's claim
that he and De Bourmont were able to convince the Germans to leave the matter in French
hands would rend to undercut any such argument.

129. Draft Articles II, supra note 83, art 33(l)(a).
130. Id. Compare the approach of the

MoDEL PENAL CoDE §

3.02 ( 1 962) (requiring that the actor believed

the act to be "necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another").
131. Draft Articles I, supra note I, art. 32 (1).
132. Philosophers, however, have debated whether the death of a larger number of persons should be thought
of as a worse state of affairs than the death of a smaUer number. See generally John M. Taurek, Should the Numbers

Count?, 6

P �I I L.

& P u s . AFF. 293 (1977). The argument that it might not be rests on the claim that h uman lives

are incommensurable (i.e. their worth cannot be compared), and thus the evil represented by the loss of h u man
life is not additive.
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I t seems, at any rate, im possible to demonstrate that executing seven Jews was
reasonably perceived as an effective way to prevent the Nazis from carrying out their

threatene d plan. Touvier presents the fact that Nazis did not take any reprisals against Jews
after the killings at Rillieux as evidence that his supposition was correct . 1 33 But first, this
fact is perhaps better evidence that the Germans intended no such actio n i n the first place.
S e cond, even i f the killings at Rillieux did cause the Nazis to alter their p l ans, it was not
reasonable to think this method would have been an effective means for acco mplishing that end.

If the Germans in fact wanted to avenge the death of Henriot by executin g a hundred Jews,
there is no reason to suppose they would have been satisfied by the execution of seven.
An d if it was reasonable to suppose they would have been satisfied with the murder of
seven, it might also have been reasonable to suppose they would have been satisfied with
the murder of three, or p erhaps with persecutions short of murder.

Finally, even if

Touvier's supposed reasoning at the time subsequently did prove accurate, he should not
be able to take credit for wild guesses which turn out to be correct.
The same effectiveness considerations that make the defense of necessity questi onable
in this situation would make the defense of distress inapplicable as well .

Even o n the

extremely unlikely hypothesis that Touvier was attempting to save the lives o f those
entrusted to his care under circumstan ces of extreme distress, it would again be impossible
to show that Touvier had adequate grounds for thinking his method effective. If one were
to accept a defense of this sort to the crime of murder, the agent, whose own life is n ot at
stake, would have to be certain both that the feared greater evil would result if h e did not
act, and that the killing he undertook i n order to avert the greater evil would successfully
avert it.

In this case, Touvier could n ot p lausibly have demonstrated either.

The deeper and more interesting question is unfortunately beyo n d the scop e o f this
Article .

Suppose Touvier had been able to demonstrate that the killings were both

n ecessary to avert greater slaughter and that they would be effective at doing so.

S hould

n ecessity or some sort o f "distress" defense be p ermitted as a defense to intenti o n al killing?
Purifying what is now a difficult ethical situation of epistemic doubt does n o t eliminate all
moral discomfort.

I t brings us face to face with the intuition that the even t which is my

intentionally destroying a h u man life may be in some ways worse than the e vent which is an
ending of a human life, from whatever source.

And it may be, therefore, that although I

might very much prefer that an earthquake would kill three human beings rather than five,
I may legitimately not prefer the death of three over the death of five if I must e ffe ctuate
the death of the three in order to save the additional two.

The preference, and the

intuition that it is legitimate, can only rest on the fact that the death o f the three under
these circumstances may be an event which is not legitimately mine to choose, even though
it may be better that three die than that five die. I may n ot, therefore, b e able to claim the
benefit of a justification where I do choose it. If it is my life that is at stake, it might seem
more reasonable to allow me a defense under the circumstances.

But presumably the

applicable defense in this case would be an excuse, and excuse is not the appropriate d e fense
for agents who perform disinterested acts for the sake of the common good.D4

1 33. Judgment of Apr. 1 3, 1 992, Cour d'appel de Paris, 1 992 G.P., No. 1, at 406 (Fr.).
134. See generally Claire Finkelstein, Self-Defense As a 'Rational Excuse': Accommodating Relations of
Domination, U. PITT. L. REv. (forthcoming 1 995); Claire Finkelstein, Duress: A Philosophical Account of the Defense
in Law, 37 U. ARIZ. L. REv. 2 5 1 ( 1 995) .

